This paper provides an empirical study of the resolution of financial distress in England. The study is based upon a unique data set of 532 financially distressed UK companies, most of which are small and privately held. The data were assembled from the private records of three major commercial banks. The main focus of our investigation is a description and analysis of the process of rescue and the extent to which it leads to turnaround or insolvency.
Introduction
It is widely accepted that bankruptcy law interferes with freedom of contracting. There is, however, considerable controversy over its role in promoting economic efficiency. Proponents of freedom of contracting i.e. contractualists, argue that commercially minded parties are capable of designing efficient contracts, which the State would be wise to enforce with as little interference as possible. Others argue for mandatory procedures to prevent co-ordination failures and premature liquidations, even though this may result in serious violations of the debt holders' contractual rights. 1 In this paper, we study these issues empirically by examining the resolution of financial distress in England where the State has adopted a contractualist approach.
It is generally accepted that English bankruptcy law stands in sharp contrast with its American cousin. In the US, Chapter 11
severely restricts the liquidation rights of creditors, resulting in frequent violations of absolute priority. American bankruptcy law, supervised by strong and active judges, can influence the outcome. In contrast,
English judges are obliged to enforce the debt contract almost to the letter. In this respect, English bankruptcy procedure is more a practice of enforcing commercial contracts than a bankruptcy law.
We examine English procedures using a unique data set specifically assembled for this study. It includes 542 financially distressed small to medium sized companies, most of which are privately held. 2 The data was provided by three commercial banks that account for 75% of the lending to the sector. 3 The information comes from their private records, and therefore includes financial information that is not disclosed to the press or rating agencies. Our data set is a dynamic one, and follows the cycle of financial distress from its 1 For two very contrasting views see Baird (1989) and Hart (1995) . 2 It was provided to us so as to inform a government-appointed committee of enquiry into UK insolvency procedures, of which one of the authors was a member. 3 There were only four large commercial banks lending to this sector.
beginning to its resolution, ending in either recovery or bankruptcy. The data records, for example, information on the replacement of management, asset sales, changes in bank debt and trade credit. To better understand the data, we were allowed direct access to the banks' lending officers, particularly those responsible for the rescue of companies, the collection of debts and the supervision of companies placed in formal bankruptcy.
The sample is, therefore, very different from the existing empirical literature, most of which focuses on large quoted US companies with considerable amounts of publicly traded debt. In many cases, the samples were conditioned on the outcome of financial distress, either Chapter 11 reorganization or a formal workout (Gilson, John and Lang (1990) and Franks and Torous (1994) ). 4 Even those studies that analyse small companies include only formal bankruptcies and rely on public announcements.
There are four principal findings. The first is that the typical debt structure consists of one senior lender (a bank) and a large number of unsecured trade creditors who together supply about 80% of the company's total borrowings. However, the liquidation rights are typically concentrated in the hands of the bank, whose collateral is, on average, about 100% of the value of its own lending. This environment leaves the trade creditors with very little protection in case of default.
As a result, their recovery rates are dramatically lower compared with those of the banks. Note that the uneven allocation of rights between the bank and the trade creditors is a contractual outcome. Hence the big question of English insolvency law is -why do the parties write ex ante contracts that may place some of them in such an 'unfair' ex post position?
The second finding concerns the pattern of debt renegotiation.
We find only one writedown in all our sample of 542 distressed companies. Also, during the period of distress the bank significantly reduces its loan exposure to individual companies, while trade creditors expand theirs, suggesting that banks have a strong bargaining position relative to other creditors. These results do not support a prominent view found in the theoretical literature, which suggests that large lenders will find themselves in a disadvantageous bargaining position in the event of debt renegotiation (see Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) ). It follows that the strategic motive for the dispersion of liquidation rights is weaker than expected.
The third finding is that the sample of distressed firms shows very little evidence of creditors' runs and other forms of co-ordination failures. For example, rarely do trade creditors, who are typically 'small and uncoordinated' lenders, trigger financial distress. Also, when we analyse the factors determining the bank's decision to start formal bankruptcy procedures, we find that the probability of bankruptcy is lower when trade creditors contract their lending. Namely, repaying the dispersed creditors is a sign of strength rather than weakness in the distressed company. We believe these findings hold the key to answering the 'important question' raised above : liquidation rights are concentrated so as to prevent co-ordination failures and enhance the bank's position as a leader in the reorganisation process. A related result is that the bank's dominant position is scarcely challenged in court. We find only one case where a Bank's action to place a firm in bankruptcy was challenged. English insolvency procedures are largely litigation free, and the business of enforcement takes place out of court.
One may argue that this effect is obtained at a cost. The largely secured position of English banks makes them 'lazy' (see Manove at al (2000) ). Such laziness will give them incentives to liquidate prematurely preferring the safety of the collateral to the hazard of the rescue process. The fourth finding of evidence on lazy banking is mixed. On the one hand, there exists an elaborate rescue process that lasts on average 7.5 months prior to resolution. About three-quarters of companies are turned around, and we do not find any evidence that banks automatically liquidate firms upon distress. Also, the bank's liquidation decision is related to the company's willingness to restructure and replace its own management. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the liquidation decision is (weakly) related to the amount of collateral held by the bank. Also, we find strong evidence of opportunistic behaviour by the bank towards other lenders. For example, control of the bankruptcy process allows the bank to allocate the costs of the bankruptcy procedures disproportionately to other lenders, thereby increasing their own recovery rates. Furthermore, the recovery rates of banks are high, averaging more than 70% of the amount owed, suggesting that the rescue process does not expose the bank to the risk of great loss.
In summary, this paper provides an analysis of financially distressed companies within a contract-based system, which relies on high levels of collateral. The results suggest that the English system has found contractual and market solutions that avoid some of the more severe problems of financial distress. The solution is based on strengthening the position of a leading lender, a bank, so as to resolve co-ordination failures and to allow for an effective monitoring of the firm (see Welch (1997) and Diamond (1984) ). This solution may have some cost in terms of lazy banking, although the cost does not seem very high. Comparisons with distressed firms in the US and Sweden suggest that the English system does not prima facie perform unfavorably.
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the law on corporate bankruptcy in England. Section 3 describes the relevant theory and section 4 the data set. Section 5 describes the debt structure in our sample of firms, including the amounts owed to different creditors, and the extent of any collateral. Sections 6 and 7
provide the main results. Section 6 describes the usage of different formal bankruptcy procedures, creditor recovery rates, and the costs of the procedures. Section 7 analyses debt renegotiations during the period of rescue and their influence on the final outcome, rescue or bankruptcy. Section 8 describes some additional features of the English system. Section 9 provides some performance comparisons with several other countries including the US. Section 10 concludes.
The Institutional Framework
English and US procedures are very different. US law imposes significant restrictions on the contractual rights of lenders in the event of default, especially the liquidation rights of senior lenders. For example, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act includes a lengthy automatic stay, the right of the debtor to remain in control of the firm, submit a reorganisation plan, and raise new, supra priority, financing.
Within this legal framework courts are accorded much discretion about the extent of the company's relief from its creditors. In contrast, the English approach is characterised by the strict enforcement of creditors' rights, including the liquidation rights of the secured creditors, as defined by the debt contract. In the language of the finance literature, US law encourages bargaining between creditors and frequently results in deviations from absolute priority, while English law does not (see Franks and Torous (1994) and Weiss (1991) ).
There are two principal types of securities in loan contracts in England: fixed charges and floating charges. A fixed charge is attached to a specific asset such as real estate or heavy machinery. A floating charge can be attached to the company, and all its assets. The crucial feature of the floating charge is that it grants the holder the right to take control of the firm in the event of default, through the appointment of an Administrative Receiver. 5 The receiver has complete control of the firm, and full discretion over whether to realize the assets by selling the firm as a going concern or liquidate it piecemeal. Crucially, the receiver's discretion cannot be challenged by the court, on the grounds that the decision has been miscalculated, because say, the firm's economic value exceeds its liquidation value.
The administrative receiver's prime responsibility is to "protect the interests of the security-holders who appointed actions. However, the holder of the floating charge has the power to veto both procedures and appoint an administrative receiver. Hence, 5 Technically, the holder has the right to appoint an insolvency practitioner as Administrative receiver, who will then assume the powers of the board of directors. This may be done with only a few hours notice. 6 However, the seniority of lenders must be respected by the receiver. This argument in favour of concentration is at variance with incomplete markets theory. Hart and Moore (1998) show that since the debt contract is incomplete, solvent borrowers may behave opportunistically towards lenders, and strategically default in order to bargain for a better deal. One solution to this problem is for the lender to strengthen his bargaining position by demanding the liquidation rights over the borrower's assets. However, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) show that this solution may work even better if debt is dispersed among many uncoordinated lenders; a small lender may reject a demand for a write-down and externalise the losses to other creditors.
Indeed, Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) argue that the firm should deliberately disperse both borrowing and liquidation rights so as to reinforce commitment, 'harden the budget constraint' and decrease the cost of capital. This argument makes the important distinction between the dispersion of debt and the dispersion of liquidation rights. We shall draw heavily on this distinction in interpreting our results.
Much of the literature on debt dispersion has public debt in mind. In our sample, most of the firms have no public equity, and none have public debt. However, trade creditors share some of the characteristics of the public debt holders. They are dispersed, typically small, and usually uncoordinated. However, they differ from public debt holders in that they have an on-going relationship with the firm, and thus a 'private benefit' in the going concern. This might make them somewhat less effective in hardening the firm's budget constraint, although it is not obvious how different they will act compared with public bondholders.
As noted above, the debt dispersion argument rests upon an externality: a small lender fails to internalise costs imposed by his action on other lenders. This externality was viewed very negatively in the bankruptcy literature, which considers debt dispersion as a source of weakness and fragility. Once the dispersed lenders have liquidation rights, they may try to obtain repayment, albeit while ignoring costs imposed on other stakeholders. Those costs will include exposing the firm to the hazard of a creditors run, asset grabbing and other forms of co-ordination failures (see Jackson (1986) and Berglof et. al. (1999) who try to reconcile the two views). Some have argued that coordination failures are an inherent weakness of a contract-based system (see Webb (1991) ). Our paper supports the view that by concentrating the liquidation rights, the English system has managed to avoid asset grabbing and creditors' runs.
The concentration of liquidation rights in the hands of the bank has resulted in bank debt being highly collateralised. Collateralisation raises the concern that banks will act 'lazy' and prematurely liquidate, preferring the safety of the secured assets to the hazard of a recovery process. 8 The following description from Hart (1995) England, may end up with outdated and old-fashioned bankruptcy procedures. Our paper provides some evidence of financial innovation in a contract-driven bankruptcy system.
Data
The paper analyses a sample of 542 firms in financial distress. The data were collected from the private records of three major commercial banks; only four banks dominate the lending market to small and medium sized firms. 9 We were allowed unrestricted access to the original files, and we have used that discretion in order to verify the quality of the data. We carried out a considerable number of interviews with the staff of each bank to check the quality of data and understand their significance.
In Figure 1 we describe the 'time line' for the cycle of distress, rescue and liquidation. When the local branch and the regional credit officers determine that a particular firm is in distress, the account is placed in the bank's specialised head-office unit for distressed companies. 10 The pronounced objective of this 'Business Support Unit' (BSU) is to 'turnaround' the company and 'send it back to branch'. We denote the point when the company entered BSU, as t=1. We also obtained information on the firm prior to the point of entry, which we denote as t=0. We denote by t=2 the point at which the rescue effort ends and the firm leaves the BSU. On average, the rescue process lasts 7.5 months.
The rescue process may end with one of the following outcomes. Either it is successful, in which case the firm's account returns to the branch, or it is sent to the 'Debt Recovery Unit ' (DRU) which is the bank's specialised unit for placing and supervising firms in formal insolvency. In almost all cases there is no return from DRU; the firm placed in formal bankruptcy is either liquidated or sold as a going concern. A third possible resolution of the rescue process is that the firm repays its debt, terminates its relationship and rebanks elsewhere.
While the event of rebanking is often recorded, there is no information
about what happens subsequently.
[insert Figure 1 here]
Choosing the sampling window involves a trade-off between two effects. On the one hand, the earlier sampling begins, the more time there is to observe the outcome of distress. On the other hand, the 10 It is infrequent that a company is placed in formal insolvency without a rescue effort in BSU. For example, for Bank 1, only 7 out of 86 firms are placed in insolvency without going into BSU first. These firms are included in the sample of bankrupt firms.
banks' records are less complete in early years. We have settled for a relatively recent period, 1997 and early 1998 (see Table 1 , Panel A).
A bank's criteria for placing a firm in the BSU are not clearly defined. Since sending a firm to BSU is an internal bank affair, no legal criteria have to be satisfied. In particular, the bank has the right to put a company in BSU even if it is not in default. In practice, the bank does not define very clear thresholds for placing a company in BSU. Rather, selection is based on the judgement of the loan officer at the local branch and the regional credit officer. Although the selection of our sample is discretionary, the decision is made by a key market participant and not by the authors of this study.
The BSU deals with firms of a particular size. Another head office unit deals with large distressed firms, usually quoted companies, while the very small distressed firms are dealt with at the local branch level. However, the three banks have defined differently the size criterion for BSU. Bank 1 uses size of debt whereas the other two banks use (different) turnover criteria (see Table 1 , Panel A). 11 As a result, the size distribution of distressed firms differs sharply across the banks. Also, the distribution is heavily skewed towards smaller firms with a median turnover of between £0.8 and £5.5 millions for the different banks (see Panel D, Table 1 ).
Panel D of Table 1 suggests that there are large differences in firm quality across banks. For example, the interest rate spreads on the loans for the three banks, collected immediately prior to entry into the BSU, are quite different. It appears that Bank 3 has the highest quality of lenders, Bank 1 the lowest quality, with Bank 2 in the middle.
A similar picture emerges from the data on the outcome of distress (see Table 1 elsewhere. We shall return to the interpretation of these facts below.
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As one might expect from a sample of small to medium size companies, most of the firms are not listed (see Table 1 , Panel C). The very few which are, are listed with AIM, a special exchange for small companies. One advantage of this sample is that small private companies, operating within highly imperfect capital markets, are likely to be more sensitive to the insolvency procedure than large listed companies with easy access to financial markets. There are only a small number of studies on small to medium size distressed companies; for example, White (1984) and LoPucki (1983) in the US,
Thorburn (2000) in Sweden, and Ravid and Sundgren (1998) in Finland. However, these studies are confined to companies in formal procedures. In contrast, we sample all firms in financial distress, unconditional of outcome. This enables us to obtain estimates of firms' characteristics across outcomes, conditional upon distress.
Debt structure
This section describes the debt structure of the firms in our sample, including the amounts owed to different creditors, the size of collateral, and the different types of charges held by creditors on the firm's assets. Panel A of Table 2 shows that companies tend to borrow a large proportion of their total debt from one bank, described as the main bank. The second largest source of borrowing is trade credit. In Banks 2 and 3, these two sources of borrowing exceed 80% of the 12 Another interesting observation from Table 1 is that average age of firms in our sample is relatively high, around 20 years. Some are more than a hundred years old. These figures differ dramatically from the average age of US firms in financial distress; see Altman (1983). total; it is somewhat lower for Bank 1, at just over 61%. 13 Much of the bank's loans are covered by collateral. As a proportion of the face value of the loan, it averages more than 100% for two of the three banks.
14 More comprehensive information about the composition of different sources of debt finance to Bank 2's customers is provided in Figure 2 . Observations on (or close to) the frontier represent firms financed by only one bank and trade creditors. However, the proportions vary considerably across companies. There is a cluster of small firms with less than 2 million pounds of total debt (designated as a circle) with more than 75% financing by trade creditors. Also, larger companies with total debt above £2 million (designated with a triangle)
tend to have more diversified sources of debt; these are marked closer to the origin in the figure.
Panel C of Table 2 shows that bank debt is almost universally secured. For Bank 1, 91.2% of loans are secured by both a fixed and a floating charge. For Bank 3 the equivalent figure is 78.9%. It is the lowest for Bank 2 at 52.6%. 15 The significance of these figures is that the bank has the liquidation rights through the floating charge, and seniority of claims through the fixed charges.
Although owners provide only a small proportion of debt finance, their individual exposure is very significant. The data for Bank 2 reveal that in 15% of cases the owners have lent £100,000 or more to the company (see Panel B, Table 2 ). This figure does not include personal guarantees, which are given by individuals in 50-60% of firms for the three banks. Discussions with the banks suggest that many of these guarantees will involve directors' personal property. 13 The number of trade creditors for each company usually exceeds one hundred. 14 The bank calculates the value of the collateral. It including personal guarantees; see next paragraph. 15 Bank 2 believes the number with both a floating and fixed charge is understated. The under-estimate stems from the way the statistics are recorded.
Much of the bank debt is provided through overdraft facilities and is thus callable at very short notice. Typically, the bank may demand repayment with a 48-hours notice period. A failure to repay will violate the loan covenant and will provide the bank with the right to place the company in bankruptcy. However, the bank will, usually, be in no hurry to use formal proceedings. If a client exceeds the limit of his overdraft facility, the bank may extend the limit, demand the client remains below the limit in the future, or restructure the loan. As we shall show below, the banks make extensive use of this discretion. In contrast to bank debt, trade credit is largely unsecured, has few liquidation rights, and recovers very little in bankruptcy. 
Formal procedures
This section describes the usage of different formal bankruptcy procedures, creditors recovery rates, and the costs of the procedures.
Incidence of different bankruptcy procedures
According to Panel A of Table 3 there exists considerable diversity in the use of formal procedures across banks. Whereas Bank 2 uses receivership in the majority of cases, Bank 1 uses winding up. The incidence of other procedures, Administration and CVAs, is low for all three banks. The row labelled 'other' includes last-minute arrangements, where the firm 'voluntarily' sells its assets and repays the loan to the bank.
[insert Table 3 here] 16 Because of this junior status and their low recovery rates in bankruptcy, some trade creditors have found a legal mechanism for retaining title to their goods even after they have been delivered to customers. However, there are significant restrictions on the use of this instrument, called Retention of Title. We are informed that although Retention of Title is widely used, as a proportion of total trade credit it is typically small. For example, in one receivership, the receiver's report states that there were two Retention of Title claims with a value of 5400 pounds, but both were rejected because title could not be proved.
The reader might infer that the diversity in procedure reflects some heterogeneity in the amount of control the bank has on the process. In particular, because winding up or Administration/CVA is a 'collective' procedure there is a more balanced allocation of power between the bank and the other creditors. This interpretation is, we believe, wrong, since the bank holds a floating charge in almost all cases of winding up, and hence, has the right to pre-empt both a winding up and an administration/CVA order. 1718 Discussions with practitioners suggest that they allow a winding up only when they expect recovery rates to be similar to, or higher than in receivership.
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A result often mentioned is that a winding up may be advantageous to the bank in small companies, because of the large fixed costs of receivership. To test this claim, we ran a probit regression relating the probability of a winding up to the absolute size of bank debt. The results confirm that the probability of a receivership increases with the size of bank debt, and the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.
Incidence of going concerns in bankruptcy
A review of bankruptcy reports by the receiver revealed considerable difficulties in determining the degree to which a company's business is sold as a going concern. In some cases, parts of the business may be liquidated, while other parts are sold as a going concern. In other cases the assets are sold but none of the staff remain. One may think that going concerns tend to trade more in receivership. This is not necessarily the case, since trading in receivership might relate to the completion of an existing contract and then be followed by liquidation.
Alternatively, an absence of trading may simply reflect a pre-packaged receivership (with only a brief period in receivership).
Because of these difficulties we report Banks 1 and 2's subjective views on the incidence of going concerns. Bank 2 contacted the managers of the recovery unit responsible for the individual companies. For a sub-sample of 27 cases, they concluded that 8 were going concern sales, 8 were partial going concerns, and the rest were liquidated. Hence, the going-concern rate conditional upon receivership is 44%, scoring a partial going concern as one half. The corresponding number for Bank 1 with 20 receiverships is 63.6% going concern sales. However, this number appears upward biased because Bank 1 has a tendency to use winding up, instead of receivership, when it makes piecemeal liquidations. These numbers compare with the proportion of going concern receiverships of 44%, published in the latest survey of the Society of Insolvency Practitioners (SPI).
Recovery rates and costs of bankruptcy
High levels of collateral result in high recovery rates for the banks in insolvency. Mean recovery rates exceed 70% for all three banks, and in two cases the median is 100%, (see Table 3 , Panel C). The calculation of recovery rates is based upon debt outstanding just before the firm entered the debt recovery unit at t=2. Since some debt is often repaid during the period of rescue, between t=1 and t=2, recovery rates are even higher based upon debt outstanding at the beginning of financial distress at t=1 (see Panel A of Table 3 ).
Panel D of Table 3 describes how the gross proceeds from insolvency are distributed among the bank, preferential creditors and the receiver's costs. In line with the previous paragraph, the mean share of the preferential creditors is about 5%. The receivership costs vary considerably across banks; the medians vary from 18.5% for Bank 2 to as high as 39.9% for Bank 3, although Bank 3 has the smallest sample. An (unweighted) average of the medians for three banks is 28.4% of the total proceeds; this figure includes the receiver's fees, the costs of selling assets, and legal fees. Realizations to the unsecured are zero (medians). As mentioned above, direct costs have a fixed-cost element and are thus likely to exhibit scale economies.
This hypothesis is consistent with the results of an OLS regression for a sample of bankruptcies for Bank 2, which shows that costs as a proportion of realisations are decreasing with the absolute size of the firm.
Given the bank appoints the receiver, one might expect the receiver to increase the bank's recovery rates at the expense of other creditors. One mechanism for such 'opportunism' is by allocating the costs of receivership towards the floating charge, rather than the fixed charge. The banks will wish to do so because it is first in priority for assets attached to the fixed charge, but only second in priority, after the preferential creditors, for the floating charge. The 'prefs', as they are called, include primarily the tax authorities with some wage arrears.
By attributing more of the total costs of receivership to the floating charge assets, the bank can increase its own recovery rate at the expense of the prefs. cases where the bank is not fully paid, the bank has used its power in 10 to allocate costs to the floating charge up to the limit of 100% of the assets realised under the floating charge (or very close to that point).
This asset substitution gives the bank another 5.8% of the total value recovered (although, as Figure 3 shows, the amount substituted, relative to total cost, is much larger). This result provides clear evidence of opportunistic behaviour on the part of the bank.
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The rescue process
In this section we study the rescue process when the company is being supervised by the Business Support Unit, between t=1 to t=2 (see Figure 1) . Most of the firms in BSU are in technical default, or are expected to default. Crucially, the bank has not yet decided to exercise its liquidation rights. The company, however, is aware that its survival depends in large part upon the bank. Our analysis makes three points.
First, we show that the data provide very little support for the BoltonScharfstein (1996) idea that the company may behave opportunistically and renegotiate down its bank debt. Hence, the bank need not disperse liquidation rights so as to harden its budget constraint. Quite the reverse, there is much to be gained by putting the bank in a position where it can co-ordinate the rescue efforts. This leads to our second observation, that creditors' runs and other coordination failures are effectively non-existent in our sample. However, the concentration of liquidation rights results in a highly collateralised bank debt, and raises a concern about lazy banking. Our third point suggests that the evidence on lazy banking is mixed.
Debt renegotiation
According to Bolton and Scharfstein (1995) , firms will behave opportunistically and renegotiate down bank debt that is not backed by a credible threat of liquidation. In our sample, bank debt is highly collateralised (see Panel A, Table 2 ). For Bank 2, the collateral is on average 74.6% of the face value of the loans, which still leaves some 20 These findings are consistent with a government report, which stated that 'a more active approach to managing preferential debt [in insolvency proceedings] would be beneficial. The Service would be likely to secure increased…recoveries of the amounts owed to them.' See The Department of Trade and Industry Redundancy room for debt renegotiation. Predictions about debt renegotiation by trade creditors are more ambiguous. Had the liquidation rights been dispersed among them, the theory would predict that they would be tough in renegotiation; but the evidence suggests that they hold few liquidation rights.
The hypothesis that the bank will be soft in debt renegotiations is strongly rejected by the data. In our sample there is only one case in which a bank writes down debt. In this sub-section we explore the possibility that debt is written down implicitly through a restructuring.
For example, we might expect that softness by the banks should be reflected in a tendency to rollover or even expand credit to the distressed company during rescue.
[insert Table 4 here]
This hypothesis is also strongly rejected. On average, the banks call back 30.8% to 43.5% of their debt, depending on the bank (see Panel A, Table 4 ). An analysis of the growth of bank debt shows that only occasionally will the bank extend further loans during the rescue period.
The only indication of 'soft behaviour' by banks is the tendency not to increase interest rate spreads in BSU, in a way that would reflect the increased risk exposure during rescue. It is noteworthy that we have found some evidence in spread regressions that Bank 2 charges prior to entry into BSU (at t=0) a higher price from firms with a history of credit distress (the regressions are available on request). Hence, it is likely that the bank increases spreads only after the firm leaves BSU and returns to Branch. The fact that the bank delays this re-pricing indicates some 'softness', albeit of a very limited scope. To study the evolution of bank debt and trade credit, we study the flow of funds among firms, bank and trade creditors, expressed as a proportion of initial total debt (see Figure 4 and Table 5 ). The main finding is that funds tend to flow out of the firm, and that the bank appropriates the major part of this flow. A company that has been through the rescue process and ends up in DRU generates funds averaging 7.5% of initial total debt (see rows labelled 'flow of funds' in Panels A and B of Table 5 ). The bank's share of these funds is 93%
(7.0 out of 7.5). On the other hand, a company undergoing a successful rescue, i.e. Branch/Other, generates funds averaging 16.8% of initial total debt (see rows labelled 'flow of funds'). Of this flow, the bank's share is 74% (12.4/16.8). Despite the roughly equal size of the loans, the bank's share of the pie is much larger than that of trade creditors, and is even larger conditional on the firm ending up in bankruptcy.
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[insert Table 5 here]
Another feature clearly visible in Figure 4 is that the bank never extends further loans during the rescue period to a company that is placed in DRU, although the trade creditors do so quite often (the 'cloud' in the right panel is vertically truncated). This finding may and Auditor General, The Stationary Office, 1996. 21 That assumes that the cost of trade credit, about which we know little, does not increase. 22 Note that the deflator differs from the one used in the calculation of the growth rates; hence the difference between flow of funds and debt-growth rates figures. The difference also reflects that for firms with small amounts of trade credit outstanding there is much larger contraction of trade credit during rescue than for those firms with large amounts of trade credit where there is modest repayment.
suggest that trade creditors possess less information than the bank.
This analysis is interesting in the light of Rajan and Peterson's (1997) evidence in the US that 'by monitoring repayment and using discounts as a trip wire, suppliers get a quick read on a firm's financial and economic health' (page 688). Finally, one may speculate on how the banks manage to harden their own budget constraint. Two explanations are possible. The first is reputation. Dealing repeatedly with so many clients, the banks may have managed to build a reputation of being tough. The second possibility is that the banks' bureaucratic structure allows them to precommit to reject opportunistic demands to write-down debt by the firm.
Both of these explanations have a common feature: that market participants have managed to find contractual solutions to some of the fundamental problems of financial distress. We shall return to this point later in this section.
The determinants of the rescue process
In order to analyse the bank's performance in rescue we estimate the conditional probability that the bank will place the distressed company in bankruptcy, i.e. in DRU (see Table 6 ). 25 The explanatory variables, which are defined in Table 7 , can be classified into three groups. The first measures firm characteristics, including size and interest rate spreads. The latter is a measure of the initial ex ante riskiness of the firm. A second group of variables refers to events that took place during rescue, including managerial replacement and the changes in the amount of debt outstanding. The third group measures debt structure, including debt concentration and loan collateral. 26 The most statistically significant variables are size, managerial replacement and the growth of trade credit during rescue. We now turn to an analysis of these results.
[insert Table 6 here]
Creditors' run
It is often argued in the literature that a system that is shaped by bilateral contracts is vulnerable to 'co-ordination failures'. In the context of financial distress, a creditors run is commonly mentioned. In our sample, if trade creditors do lead a run on the distressed firm, we might observe that a greater contraction of trade credit is related to an increasing likelihood that the firm is sent to DRU and is placed in insolvency. As one may observe from Table 6 , the hypothesis is strongly rejected as the coefficient for the growth of trade credit is positive, i.e. the wrong sign, and either significant at the 5% level or marginally significant. A higher repayment of trade credit is correlated with the firm avoiding insolvency.
24 Cited in Franks and Sussman (2000) . 25 Data quality considerations restrict our analysis to Bank 2 only.
Stronger evidence against the creditors' run hypothesis is provided by the very low incidence of winding up-orders prior to entry into the BSU i.e. at t=1. As described earlier, a winding up order is the legal remedy available to trade creditors if the firm defaults. Table 4 shows that in the whole sample there are only 11 winding-up orders at that stage, of which 4 were issued by The Crown i.e. the tax authorities. In contrast, Bank 3 has provided a verbal description for the 'trigger' of financial distress in its sample. Of 109 cases, 100 were initiated by the bank and the rest by the owners. There is not a single case where the bank reports that an action by the trade creditors is the trigger for insolvency.
We believe that the absence of co-ordination failures is directly to result in lower co-ordination failures. Whether it also results in a lower incidence of liquidations, is a question we shall examine in a later section.
Lazy banks and excessive liquidations
An important concern often cited in the bankruptcy literature relates to the effect that concentration of control rights has on banks. Such concerns are often related to various attributes of lazy banking.
Evidence already cited in the paper suggests that an elaborate rescue process exists and results in 75% of distressed firms being turned around, and returning to their branch. Thus, the idea that firms are automatically liquidated upon distress is strongly rejected by the data.
However, the result that banks use the period of rescue to contract their lending to the distressed firm is consistent with the idea of lazy banking.
A related result is that the coefficient for the growth rate of bank credit is positive and highly significant for estimation 1 of Table 6 . It is the correct sign but not significant for other estimations. Hence, the more bank credit contracts in BSU, the more likely the company retains control over its own affairs. The most plausible explanation for these results is that the bank prefers the firm to take the necessary steps to repay, without the bank having to place it in insolvency. This way the bank continues its banking relationship with the firm and acquires a reputation for a going concern approach to bank lending. If however the firm fails to repay, the bank will take control and implement the necessary measures. The incentives to let the firm restructure itself may also be affected by the relatively high costs of bankruptcy that we report later in the paper.
In Table 6 , a dummy variable for managerial replacement (D-MANG) is highly significant in all the regression. The negative coefficient indicates that a firm that restructures and replaces its manager will be rewarded with a lower probability of liquidation, a result that obviously conflicts with the lazy banking hypothesis. This finding also sheds light on the role of size in our sample. The firms that replace managers tend to be larger than firms that do not. This is because ownership and control tend to be combined in small firms.
Since the owner and the manager are the same person, replacing a manager also means giving up ownership, with all the 'private benefits' that it carries.
A much-emphasized attribute of lazy banking is related to the amount of collateral. However, the relationship between security coverage and outcome is likely to be non-monotonic. If the firm has only a little collateral, the 'lazy option' of liquidating the firm is of very little value; the bank has more of an equity stake in the firm and thus has a stronger incentive to bet on the firm's recovery. By the same argument, the better collateralised the company is, the stronger is the bank's incentive to exercise its liquidation option. However, beyond a certain point, the bank's incentive to liquidate may actually fall. For example, if the amount of the collateral exceeds the value of the loan, the bank may actually gain by waiting if there is some possibility of recovery and continuance of the relationship. It follows that the probability of DRU should be concave in the security coverage ratio (SCRT1/MAIN1). In Table 6 we test this hypothesis with a slope dummy that has a breaking point at the value of one (D-Slope). The coefficients have signs that are consistent with the concavity hypothesis, but are not statistically significant. Changing the equation using a square term and a different breaking point does not alter the results. Thus, the evidence in favour of excessive bankruptcies is not strong.
Additional features of the English system
In this section we describe some additional features of our sample including the incidence of litigation, competition between banks and innovation.
The Incentive to Litigate
Insolvency procedures in England are largely resolved out of court. For all three banks, only one case has been reported where the appointment of a receiver was challenged in court. In this case the directors of the company requested that the receivership should be annulled because the debenture was defective. It was also argued that the bank did not give the company sufficient time to clear its indebtedness. The company's appeal was rejected.
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This reality is in sharp contrast to the intensive court involvement in the US. The UK outcome reflects the fact that the courts have very little discretion in bankruptcy, and therefore the parties have little incentive to spend resources influencing them.
Competition between banks
It is sometimes argued that once a company mortgages its assets to a bank, it is locked into a banking relationship, which will make the system inherently less competitive. It is thus surprising to find a remarkably high incidence of firms switching banking relationships during a period of distress, at least for one of the banks. The incidence of rebanking while in BSU is 4.1%, 8.3%, and 24.7%, for each bank respectively.
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More evidence on rebanking exists in the records of Bank 2, which reported to us both the date at which the company was incorporated and the date it opened an account with Bank 2. Of the original sample of 192, the bank has data on both age and tenure for 186 companies. Of these, 89 switched to Bank 2 from another bank at some date in the past. Of 23 that have joined the bank in the last two years, 7 have switched from another bank, the other 16 being new firms. We interpret the latter as confirmation that there is an active market for banking relations, and that firms in distress are not excluded from this market. 27 However, our data set may not contain information on litigation where the bank is not directly involved. For example, it may not record litigation against the receiver. 28 These numbers are lower than the incidence of terminated accounts cited in Table   1 . A terminated account may be followed by liquidation, acquisition or rebanking. The latter figures have been calculated after discussions with the banks on individual cases.
The high incidence of rebanking among distressed companies with Bank 3, together with a significantly lower incidence of formal insolvency (see Table 1 ), suggest a diversity in lending strategies within English banking. There are two interpretations. The first is that Bank 3 has innovated a new, more cost effective way of lending money. Table 1 shows they charge the lowest spreads of the three banks. According to Bank 3's credit officers, the innovation consists of intensive monitoring allowing them to terminate relations early with those customers more likely to end up in bankruptcy. It is interesting to note, however, that this strategy decreases the incidence of using the Bank's liquidation rights, but not the threat of using them (Bank 3's loans are very highly collateralised, see Panel A, Table 2 ).
The second interpretation is that the equilibrium in this market is separated, where Bank 3 specialises in high quality borrowers, Bank 1 in low quality borrowers, and Bank 2 is in the middle. According to this interpretation, Bank 3 can penalise under-performance by terminating the relationship, rather than liquidating the company, but this strategy is supported by a higher probability of liquidation once a borrower shifts to a lower quality bank.
Innovation
It is sometimes argued that economies where institutions evolve through a process of private contracting are inherently conservative and biased towards under-innovation; see Franks and Sussman (2000) . Indeed, English bankruptcy is regarded by some as classical example of such institutional stagnation. It is therefore interesting to note that during the period of data collection, two legal and financial innovations have taken place.
The first is attorneyship. It was developed by one of the banks included in our sample, and was designed to solve financial distress resulting from poor management, but where there is relatively a high degree of trust between the bank and the company. Under the arrangement, the firm would give the bank power of attorney to manage its own affairs, and the bank's credit officers would take temporary control over the business, without the owners losing title over the assets or the directors formally stepping down. The bank has experimented with this instrument, but has yet to draw any conclusions.
The second innovation, undertaken by a bank that is not included in our sample (referred to as Bank 4), is a system by which receivers must tender for an appointment. As described above, the direct costs of receivership are quite high in our sample, averaging about 28%
(Panel D, Table 3 ). An initial study of 31 receiverships by Bank 4
suggests that the median costs are between about one third and one half lower than for receiverships in our sample for Bank 1, after controlling for the size of company. 29 The bank has reported average costs of 14.5% as a percentage of total recoveries, for the sample of 31 receiverships.
International comparisons
In this section, we examine the issue of how differences in institutional arrangements impact on outcomes. Does the UK's pro-creditor system produce very different outcomes from the pro-debtor system of the US? To what extent do Coasian responses affect the difference in outcomes across the two codes?
Our inter-country comparison includes the US, Sweden and the UK. Sweden provides a useful benchmark because until recently it had a receivership procedure that was very similar to that of the UK. To compare outcomes of different codes, we use three measures of ex post performance including the incidence of piece-meal liquidations in 29 For companies in receivership with realizations of between £100,000-£500,000 the costs for Bank 4 are 20% compared with 29% for Bank 1; between £500,000-£1000,000 the costs are 9% compared with 19%, respectively, and over 1,000,000 the costs are 7% compared with 16%, respectively. bankruptcy, recovery rates for creditors and direct costs of the bankruptcy process.
With one exception the studies we have used for comparative purposes include firms of similar size: the median size of assets of firms in Sweden is $1.3 millions, between $0.57 and $0.8 million for the US, and about $3.5 millions for the UK sample. 30 The one exception is recovery rates for creditors in the US where only data for large quoted companies are available.
Incidence of going concerns
For the UK sample, the proportion surviving as going concerns in receiverships is 44% for one bank, and 64% for another. 31 In Sweden,
Thorburn (2000) reports that 75% of a sample of 205 firms placed in receivership were sold as going concerns by a court-appointed trustee.
Ravid and Sundgren (1998) list five studies that calculate going concern rates for samples of firms entering Chapter 11 in the US.
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The average rate of going concerns is 26%, although there is substantial variation across the samples.
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Higher rates of going concern are possible in a pro creditor system if the main lender is well informed, as is the case with the main bank.
In addition, the 1986 Directors Disqualification Act makes it an offence for directors in the UK to continue as a going concern an insolvent 30 UK asset figures are estimated using total face value of debt outstanding; they exclude equity. 31 The incidence of piecemeal liquidation for our total sample of distressed firms is between 9-12%.
32 Piece-meal liquidations are assumed where the firm enters Chapter 11 and then switches to Chapter 7 or if a plan is not filed. Chapter 7 reorganizations almost always involve a sale of business that has ceased to be a going concern. The Head Trustee of a Californian Bankruptcy District could remember only one case of a sale of a going concern out of more than 100,000 Chapter 7 cases. 33 The studies include Lo Pucki (1983), White (1984) , Kerkman (1987) , Flynn (1989) , Jensen-Conklin (1992) . The incidence of going concerns is 26%, 44%, 27%, 17%, 17%, respectively. Different definitions for White (1984) could produce a rate as high as 70%. 34 The same authors' sample of Finnish firms shows a going concern rate of 29%.
business. For the year 1999/2000, 1540 directors were disqualified from being a company director for trading whilst insolvent. 35 There is no equivalent legislation in the US. rates of between 80-86% for secured and bank debt, while recovery rates for junior debt are 29%. 36 Overall recovery rates are 51%. We can conclude that recovery rates for senior creditors are similar in the three countries, although total recovery rates are higher for the US.
Recovery Rates for different creditors
The latter may reflect that recovery rates are higher for larger companies because of the large fixed costs element in bankruptcy
procedures.
An important difference in recovery rates for the US and UK concerns payouts for junior creditors, which are much higher in the US.
Since senior creditors are not paid in full, payments to junior creditors involve a violation of absolute priority. One explanation is that Chapter 11 is a collective system, and reorganization plans must be approved by all classes of creditors, thus giving some power to the most junior claimants. To reduce the influence of small creditors in voting on reorganization plans, some plans include a provision that small unsecured creditors below $1000 be paid in full. 37 In the case of Flagstar Corporation, unsecured creditors (with one third being trade creditors) were paid in full even though more senior creditors accepted significant writedowns (see Gilson 1998 ). 
Costs of bankruptcy process
It has already been reported that the average costs of UK procedures for the three banks are about 28% of total realizations. This compares with 13% in the Swedish study cited above and 14% in US Chapter 11
reorganizations. These costs are calculated as a proportion of cash realizations (see Thorburn (2000) and Lawless et al (1994) ). 3940 Thus, the UK figures look high by comparison with all these studies.
There is reason to believe that the incentives of the UK receivership system do not always act to minimize costs. For example, if the banks know they are to be repaid in full, then any reduction in costs will not accrue to them but to the preferred or unsecured creditors. Median recovery rates for banks of 100% suggest that this lack of incentives is important. The evidence cited in Section 8.3 also supports the idea that direct costs in the UK are relatively high. Where a new method of tendering has been used the costs of 14% are remarkably close to the figures reported for other jurisdictions, and 36 The studies are Franks and Torous (1994) and Tashjian, Lease and McConnell (1996), cited in Thorburn (2000) . 37 For example, in the Chapter 11 reorganization of Caldor and Bradlees the debtor was allowed to pay more than to other unsecured creditors on the grounds that ongoing business relationships need to be preserved. I am grateful to Stuart Gilson for this observation. 38 Junior unsubordinated claims agreed writedowns of 88% and senior subordinated claims agreed writedowns of 5%)); all these were senior to unsecured creditors. 39 Andrade and Kaplan (1998) examined a sample of highly leveraged transactions that became distressed. They found costs, both direct and indirect to be between 10 and 20% of firm value. Where the firm was financially but not economically distressed, the costs were negligible.
substantially lower than the figure of 28% reported earlier for our sample.
In summary, the UK is ranked second after the Sweden for the incidence of going concerns, second for creditor recovery rates after the US, and third for costs of bankruptcy. Besides providing some insight into the relative performance of the UK system, the figures suggest that differences in outcomes between different bankruptcy codes and procedures cannot be easily gauged from measures of procreditor or pro-debtor type procedures. As a Coasian view would suggest, each system develops mechanisms for avoiding or mitigating more obvious failings.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper was to test how different insolvency systems can influence both the rescue process and bankruptcy outcomes. Given the statutory system of the US, the UK provides a particularly interesting institutional environment because of its freedom of contracting approach. For our sample of small to medium sized companies, the UK system tends to concentrate liquidation rights in the hands of one lender, a bank, with loans being highly collateralised. In contrast, unsecured lenders, mainly trade creditors, have few liquidation rights. The result is that banks largely control both bankruptcy and workout procedures. In the event of failure, they recover much of their loans, while other creditors, especially trade creditors, recover very little. This difference in recovery rates between creditors is accentuated by the fact that trade creditors expand their lending during the period of distress, and banks contract theirs.
However, this concentration of liquidation rights and high level of loan collateralisation does not give rise to automatic liquidation for firms in financial distress. On the contrary, banks implement a fairly elaborate rescue process. As a result, the proportion of distressed firms that 40 In Ravid and Sundgren (1998) in Finland direct costs are 15%.
recover is about 75%, and nearly one half of firms placed in bankruptcy are sold as going concerns. There are few if any signs of co-ordination failures that are suppose to afflict UK-type bankruptcy systems that are largely based on bilateral contracts between two lenders. However, the UK system may be regarded as unfair, especially to the unsecured. A comparison of these findings with those of other countries suggests that the classification of bankruptcy systems on the basis of whether they are pro-creditor or pro-debtor may not give great insights as to differences in outcomes.
Figure 1
The figure describes the cycle of distress and sampling procedure. A firm enters the bank's rescue unit (BSU) at t=1, and leaves it at t=2. Either the firm returns to branch, or is placed in the DRU at t=3, which usually means being placed in formal bankruptcy procedures. Table 2 Composition of the debt structure for firms entering the bank's distress unit i.e. BSU, at t=1. Panel A describes the composition of the debt structure of the firms that enter the BSU at t=1, and the amount of collateral given to the bank as a proportion of the loan outstanding to the main bank. Panel B shows how much lending there is from owners at the 85, 90 and 95 percentile. Panel C describes the proportion of the sample which has various charges or liens on the firm and the proportion with loan guarantees from owners. 
Figure 4
The flow of funds to trade creditors and the bank for individual firms, calculated as a share of initial total debt, during the period of rescue, Bank 2. The two figures illustrate the flows to the bank debt and trade creditors for 132 firms. The first graph includes 68 that went back to Branch and the second graph 64 that went to DRU. 
Table 6
The determinants of the outcome of rescue process for Bank 2. The dependent variable is the outcome, either the company is placed in Recovery Unit. The independent variables are described in Table 7 . Value in parenthesis: z-statistic. Estimation method: probit.
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